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Abstract— The widespread use of information technology
transforms businesses continuously and rapidly. Information
technology introduces new threats to organizations as well. Risk
analysis is an important tool in order to make correct decisions
and to deal with cyber threats. Identification and valuation of
assets is a crucial process that must be performed in risk
analyses. Without properly identified and valued assets, the
results of risk analyses lead to wrong decisions. Wrong decisions
on information security may directly affect corresponding
business processes. There are some finished and applied methods
in literature for asset identification and valuation; however these
methods are complicated and are not suitable for practical
information security management projects. In this paper, a
hierarchy based asset valuation method is proposed. Our method
is intended to minimize the common mistakes that were done
during Information Security Management Projects. The
application of the method has not been performed yet; however it
is thought that it can ease the processes and reduce the number
of errors.

Number of security incidents and threats rises day by day
[4]. Since most of the business operations depend on
information technologies, a threat to the information
technologies means a threat to the business itself. Bulgurcu et
al. state that some possible results of the information security
incidents could be loss of credibility and monetary damage [5].
Farahmand et al. believes that impact on the business is a good
indicator to determine the cost of a computer security incident
[6]. Other than the financial impact, security incidents may
have effects on intangibles such as:


The brand image, public reputation and goodwill
in the market place,



The financial value of business transactions,



Public and customer confidence in the accuracy of
business transactions,



Public and customer confidence in the fraudresistance of business transactions,



The ability to maintain revenue cash flow in a
timely manner,



The ability to resolve disputes beyond reasonable
doubt,



The ability to meet the requirements of regulators
[6].
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Information technologies evolved from stand alone batch
applications to modern interconnected mobile systems. This
evolution resulted in the widespread use of information
technologies by all types of businesses. Information
technologies have become an inseparable part of doing
business today. Two decades ago, most of the business
processes were paper based in almost every organization;
however almost every process is dependent on information
technologies today. Therefore, while information systems
started as tools for improving operational efficiency, later on,
they acquired an indispensable role for the organization’s
survival [1], [2].
Parallel to the common use of information systems in
organizations, threats and attacks on the information systems
also increased rapidly. Rapid change of computing
environments provides many opportunities for attackers. For
instance, widespread use of distributed communication systems
gives attackers the chance of hiding themselves after breaking
into a system remotely [3]. Mobile equipment attract hackers’
attention because of their widespread use. Mobile systems are
also vulnerable to attacks [4].

Since information technologies are more critical than ever
and organizations heavily rely on information systems, the
responsibility of protecting these systems belongs to senior
level management rather than the head of information
processing department [7]. Information security has become
one of the top priorities of senior level management [5]. In
ISO/IEC 27001:2005, management shows its commitment to
the organization’s information security by deciding the criteria
for accepting risks and the acceptable level of risk [8].
Information security aims to provide controls in order to
mitigate risks that affect the information of organizations.
Critically, there is a danger of spending money on risks that
may not be really dangerous, while ignoring others that may be
serious [9]. The top level management, which is the decision
making body and responsible for choosing the security
measures for information security risks, needs a practical
guidance for choosing necessary risk reduction controls to
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obtain an acceptable level of security. Risk management
techniques provide assistance to organizations for identifying
threats and select cost-effective security measures to minimize
the total expected cost of losses [3], [10].
II.

INFORMATION SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS

Although they have different meanings in literature, risk
analysis, risk assessment and sometimes risk management are
used interchangeably. We will use risk analysis in the
remaining part of the paper. Risk is defined as a probabilistic
function of a threat successfully attacking an asset through a
specific vulnerability [3], [10-13].
As shown in Fig. 1, asset value, asset vulnerability and
probability of the realization of a threat forms the risk and all
these factors have a positive effect on risk.

Figure 1. Risk, threat, vulnerability and asset relationship [11]

The risk function given in (1) has three variables: asset,
vulnerability and threat. The first input of the risk function,
asset, is defined as anything that has value to the organization
in ISO/IEC 27001:2005. Determining the value of an asset is a
crucial part of risk analysis.
Risk = f (asset, vulnerability, threat)

(1)

Vulnerability is a defect in an asset that may be used by a
threat to attack an information system. Software and hardware
companies try to adapt the rapid pace of change at information
technologies for sustaining their competitiveness; however
rapid change of technology may cause neglecting security
requirements which slow down the production process. Every
day new technologies are introduced and attackers find a
vulnerability to exploit it after a while. For a successful risk
analysis, security analyst should reach and exchange
information about new technologies, products, threats, or
vulnerabilities and keep themselves up to date.
Threats to information systems may impact confidentiality,
integrity and/or availability of an asset. Threats may operate in
several ways such as destruction (the asset is not recoverable),
modification (changing the representation of an asset),
disclosure (violation of need-to-know), and denial of service

(resources are unavailable to authorized users) [3]. Common
threats for information security are listed below [14].
1) Act of Human Error or Failure (accidents, employee
mistakes)
2) Compromises to Intellectual Property (piracy,
copyright infringement)
3) Deliberate Acts of Espionage or Trespass
(unauthorized access and/or data collection)
4) Deliberate Acts of Information Extortion (blackmail
of information disclosure)
5) Deliberate Acts of Sabotage or Vandalism
(destruction of systems or information)
6) Deliberate Acts of Theft (illegal confiscation of
equipment or information)
7) Deliberate Software Attacks (viruses, worms,
macros, denial of service)
8) Forces of Nature (fire, flood, earthquake, lightning)
9) Quality of Service Deviations from Service Providers
(power and WAN service issues)
10) Technical Hardware Failures or Errors (equipment
failure)
11) Technical Software Failures or Errors (bugs, code
problems, unknown loopholes)
12) Technological Obsolescence (antiquated or outdated
technologies)
Risk analysis methods are divided into two major groups
as qualitative and quantitative methods. Quantitative risk
analysis methods use mathematical tools (e.g. Bayesian
networks, fuzzy logic) to assess the risk [12]. Quantitative
methods try to calculate annualized loss expectancy in
monetary value for each threat and find the cost of a possible
damage [1], [3]. Courtney method, Livemore Risk Analysis
Methodology (LRAM), Information Security Risk Analysis
Method (ISRAM), and ALE using program evaluation review
technique (PERT) are instances of quantitative risk analysis
methods [1], [7]. Quantitative methods require a solid
mathematical background to assess information security risks
and implementation of these methods requires more time and
effort than qualitative methods [3], [12].
Qualitative risk analysis methods claim that using
monetary values to express a possible consequence of a threat
is not a good method [1]. Generally, these methods are based
on judgments and perceptions of the security expert that
conducts the risk analysis and make use of several techniques
such as questionnaires, scenario analysis, and fuzzy metrics to
assess the suitability of the safeguards against the identified
threats [1], [3].
Neither of these methods have been proven superior to the
other. An organization can choose any of these methods that is
suitable for it, for instance qualitative methods are suggested
for risk analysis of public organizations [12]. Advantages and
disadvantages of these two types of methods are summarized
in Table 1 [1], [6].

organization. There are not many studies on asset valuation
methods for information security risk analysis processes. We
summarize the academic works on asset valuation in the
remaining part of the section.
TABLE I.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF RISK
ANALYSIS METHODS

Quantitative methods

Qualitative methods
Advantages

Applicability to all assets
Mathematical foundation
Using a management specific language
(Support cost benefit decision)
Accuracy tends to increase over time as
the organization builds historic record
of data while gaining experience.

Simple risk calculation
Usefulness when asset value is
irrelevant or unknowable
Less time consuming
Easier to involve people who are not
experts on security or computers.

Disadvantages
Inappropriateness of monetary asset
value
Inappropriateness of general statistics
Time consuming, requires much
preliminary work

Coarse granularity
Inability of cost benefit decision
Subjective results, depend on quality of
risk management team

Whatever methodology is used in risk analysis, there are
desired properties of a risk analysis method. The essential
properties of a risk analysis method are listed below [10].


Common acceptance by all related parties (e.g.
management, users, IT department)



Handling new technologies, threats and vulnerabilities



Logically sound



Repeatable



Delivering optimum protection for the cost



Being open to continuing evaluation from all parties



Being accompanied by clear documentation



Being cyclical, repeated periodically.

Up to now, we examined two of the inputs of the risk analysis
function, which are vulnerability and threat. The third input,
asset, is detailed in the next section of the paper.
III.

THE IDENTIFICATION AND VALUATION OF
ASSETS

The identification and valuation of assets is a crucial step
in order to have an objective, repeatable and logically sound
risk analysis process. The asset identification and valuation
process also affects the comprehensiveness and effectiveness
of the eventual risk analysis process. Therefore, asset
identification and valuation is not a straightforward task.
Identification and valuation of information assets gets more
difficult when an asset is intangible such as reputation of the

Oscarson and Karlsson propose a national model for
information classification. Their model is based on two
aspects: the information system security aspect and the levels /
types of seriousness. In the information systems security
aspect, there are two documents for definitions of
confidentiality, integrity and availability. These documents are
ISO 27000 series (ISO/IEC 27001:2005 and ISO/IEC
27002:2005) which are compulsory for governmental
authorities in Sweden and SIS Handbook 550 Terminologi för
Informationssäkerhet (in Swedish, Terminology for
Information Security). These documents say nothing about
level and types of seriousness which is the other dimension of
the classification. Oscarson and Karlsson define three levels
for this aspect: moderate, significant and serious. According to
the suggested model, the information aspect is classified and
valued for these two dimensions [15].
Vidalis identifies the value of information assets according
to confidentiality, integrity and availability. Value of an asset
is defined as follows; “An exploitation of an asset ‘A’ can
cause a loss of confidentiality ‘Co’, a breach of integrity ‘In’
or a loss of availability ‘Av’. The value ‘V’ of each asset is the
cost of restoring or repairing the sum of the above qualities in
their previous state.”. ‘Co’ is the monetary value to restore
confidentiality, ‘In’ is the monetary value to restore integrity,
‘Av’ is the monetary value to restore availability, and ‘V’ the
monetary value of an asset. The definition is formulated in (2)
[16].
V = f (Co) + f (In) + f (Av)

(2)

Engelsman’s study on valuation of information assets is in
a wider perspective than information security. Information
valuation depends on four dimensions in Engelsman’s model:
defining information assets, identifying the audience for the
valuation, determination of the context of the valuation and
identifying what economic attributes of information to include
in the valuation. In his four stage model, after the first step of
identifying assets, the external and internal audiences for
information assets are identified. External audiences are useful
for determining the contribution of information to the overall
value of an organization and valuation for an internal audience
shows the value of the information to encourage better use of
the information such as improved decision making. The third
stage is determining the context of valuation e.g. valuation of
information for security risk management and valuation of
information for information life cycle management. The forth
and last stage is valuation of information using an existing
model or coming up with a model that is suitable for this
specific valuation context [17].
Caralli et al. from Carnegie Mellon University Software
Engineering Institute, prepared a technical report to introduce
the next generation of the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset,

and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) methodology,
OCTAVE Allegro. In their report, they propose a framework to
develop an information asset profile. Development of an
information asset profile is composed of eight steps. First step
is identifying the information assets through brainstorming on
information assets that are used in day-to-day work processes
and other assets that are closely related to these assets. Second
step is focusing on the few critical assets which are critical to
accomplishing goals and achieving the organization’s mission
and those that are important because of such factors as
regulatory compliance. Remaining steps are performed as a
completion of a worksheet for each asset. In the third step, the
name of the critical asset is written on the worksheet. In forth
step, rationale for the selection of the asset as a critical asset is
reported. In the fifth step the agreed-upon description of the
information asset is determined. The sixth step is defining the
owners of the asset. The seventh step is identifying security
requirements (confidentiality, integrity, availability, and other)
for this asset. At the last and eighth step, selection of the most
important security requirement is performed [18].
Grimaila and Fortson use information valuation in the cyber
damage assessment process of military systems. Information
classification is a baseline valuation of an asset and to complete
the valuation process the contextual value of the information
should be determined. Contextual value of an information asset
depends on how much the asset supports the organizational
mission. According to Grimaila and Fortson, most of the
existing models focus on economic metrics; however the
intangible value of an information asset is used more
frequently in a military context compared to economic value.
In the information valuation method, first step is the
classification of information. The second step is to identify the
contextual value of the information which is the most
important component in information asset valuation.
Contextual value is composed of three factors: mission
binding, age, and state. Mission binding is about how related
the information asset is to the organization’s mission. If the
information asset has a critical function for the organization’s
mission, it will possess a relatively high value. The second
factor, age, is about change in the value of the information
asset and its relation with the organization’s mission during its
lifecycle. The third and last factor of contextual value is the
state in which the value of the information asset is determined
in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability [19].
IV.

THE PROPOSED METHOD

Our method is proposed in order to minimize the common
mistakes that were made during Information Security
Management Projects that were performed for public
organizations of Turkey.
According to Karabacak and Ozkan [?], during the
identification and valuation of assets, authors realized that
only tangible assets like hardware and software were listed in
almost all of these eight projects. For the “information”
security projects, the most crucial assets are “information”
assets, which are intangible. Without taking “information” into
consideration, the asset inventory cannot be established
reliably and the values of assets cannot be determined

correctly. The vulnerabilities in assets and the threats that
exploit these vulnerabilities are determined by using asset
inventory. Thus, a tangible asset inventory would cause an
incomplete risk analysis focusing only on technical
dimensions of information security disregarding the social and
non-technical dimensions. The inevitable consequence of this
problem is to assign wrong asset values to hardware and
software; because the information that is processed by
hardware and software is not determined [12].
In order to recover from this mistake, a practical asset
valuation method is proposed. There are two important
contributions of the proposed method. First of all, it helps risk
analysts to list information assets completely. Secondly, it
helps the values of hardware and software to be determined
correctly. Our proposed method is presented in Fig. 2. As with
other methods, firstly assets are identified by using a top-down
approach (the left arrow in Fig. 2). After assets are identified,
the valuation of assets are performed by using a bottom-up
approach (the right arrow in Fig. 2).
First of all, hardware assets are identified, because they are
the most tangible assets, so they can easily be determined
without much effort. After hardware assets are identified, the
software assets that are run on each hardware asset are
identified. After software assets are identified, the information
assets that are processed by software assets are identified.

Figure 2. Asset pyramid showing asset identification and asset valuation
processes

After assets are identified, the values of assets are
determined. The result of asset identification and valuation
processes should be presented in asset tables. The asset tables when filled with asset names and values- form the asset
inventory which is a basic component for Information Security
Management projects. The asset tables may contain not only
asset names and values but also other information like serial
numbers, owner, location etc. In our proposed method, the
templates of asset tables for hardware, software and
information assets are shown in Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4
respectively. Note that, there are some differences among these
tables.
The template table for hardware assets is shown in Table 2.
An important point is that, the physical location of a hardware

asset is included in order not to forget any hardware asset. In
our proposed method, only hardware assets that processes
information are written in the asset table. As an example,
mouse and keyboards are not written in the inventory.

TABLE II.

THE ASSET TABLE TEMPLATE FOR HARDWARE ASSETS

The
template table for software assets is shown in Table 3. The
“processing hardware” column is used in order to control
whether all software assets are written in the inventory.
TABLE III.

THE ASSET TABLE TEMPLATE FOR S ASSETS

The template table for information assets is shown in Table
4. The “processing software” column is used in order to control
whether all information assets are written in the inventory.
TABLE IV.

THE ASSET TABLE TEMPLATE FOR INFORMATION ASSETS

Note that all tables include minimum set of columns for
demonstration purposes. The other columns like "explanation"
and "license" can be added for real information security
projects.
After hardware, software and information assets are
determined, the asset values are determined for all types of
assets. The work done in the asset valuation process is to fill
the last three columns of the templates. Asset valuation is
based on three values, confidentiality, integrity and availability
that are the tripod of information security. Asset valuation is a
bottom-up process as it is presented by the right arrow in Fig.
2.
The confidentiality, integrity and availability values of
information are directly related with the nature of the
information. Also, information is the most crucial asset for
organizations especially in the context of “Information”
Security Management Projects. Those are the most important
reasons why a bottom-up approach is adopted. The
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability CIA values of
software are directly related with the Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability values of information that is processed by that
software. In the same manner, the Confidentiality, Integrity
and Availability values of hardware are directly related with
the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability values of the
software that is processed by that hardware. The value of

software and hardware is directly proportional to the value of
processed information. The monetary value of hardware can be
negligible compared to the value of information processed by
that hardware.
If there is a number of software in a specific hardware, the
highest Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability values
assigned to the software assets are taken into account when
assigning Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability values to
the hardware. The same condition is valid for determining
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability values of specific
software, if the software in question processes more than one
type of information.
As an example, Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 is filled with
fictitious asset information. First of all, hardware assets are
identified and the first four columns of Table-2 are filled.
Secondly, software assets are identified and the first four
columns of Table-3 are filled. Thirdly, information assets are
identified and the first four columns of Table-4 are filled. The
top-down approach (left arrow at Fig. 2) is finished at this
point.
After all asset types are identified, bottom-up approach
(right arrow at Fig. 2) starts in order to determine asset values.
Firstly, information asset values are determined and the values
are written at the last three columns of Table-4. For the
"information security" context, it is easier to assign
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability values to
information assets compared to hardware and software assets,
because information assets are not complicated, they are plain
and elementary. Secondly, software asset values are
determined by using the values of information assets in Table4. It can be seen from Table-4 that personal data and salary
data are processed by encryption software. Therefore,
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability values of encryption
software is determined by using Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability values of processed information, namely personal
data and salary data. For instance, the confidentiality value of
encryption software is the highest of confidentiality values of
the two information assets, personal data and salary data. The
same rule applies to integrity and availability values. These
highest values are underlined in Table-4. Thirdly, hardware
asset values are determined. This is performed by using the
software asset table, Table-3. As it can be seen from Table-3,
both the operating system and encryption software are
processed by the fileserver. Therefore, the Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability values of these software are used in
order to determine the
Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability values of the fileserver hardware. The underlined
values in Table-3 are also the Confidentiality, Integrity and
Availability values of the fileserver hardware. After hardware
asset values are determined, the bottom-up approach finishes
and the asset inventory is created.
V.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

First of all, our method has some drawbacks. It only deals
with digital assets. As an example, it does not cover printed
books. The assets that are not hardware, software or digital
information should be considered separately. Our method can

be used effectively in risk analysis processes where mostly
information technologies are used.
Risk analysts should be cautious while dealing with
hardware such as hard disks. There is no explicit software (e.g.
operating systems, application programs) in hard disks. They
run special software called firmware; but firmware is not
usually considered as a standalone asset. It is considered with
hardware as a whole. Therefore, risk analysts should skip the
middle layer of the asset valuation pyramid and should directly
identify the information assets within hard disks.
An important question is: “Which values among
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability should be taken into
account during the risk analysis process?” Is using arithmetic
mean a good idea? For our proposed method, the answer is
related to the type of risk involved. If the risk is related with
the availability of information, the availability value should be
taken into account. As an example, a flood may affect the
availability of a server, but it does not affect confidentiality and
integrity. So, when evaluating the risk, the availability value of
related hardware should be used but not confidentiality and
integrity values.
We think that our proposed method can ease the asset
valuation and risk analysis processes. Our practical approach
can help organizations that try to improve their information
security procedures. Our next step will be to apply our method
in information security projects in the Turkish Public Sector
Organizations and to share the results with academia.
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